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HARVARD

RRC NEWSLETTER

RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER

Volume X, No. 12

October 10, 1986

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION FIGURES

Product	Aug. 1986	Prod. in 1st 8 mo of 1986	1st 8 Mo. 86 as % of same of 85
Elect. (b.kw.hrs)	120	1045	104%
Petroleum (inc. gas cond.)(mil. metric tons)	52.6	407	103
Nat. Gas (b.cu.mtr)	55.8	450	107
Coal (mil. metric tons)	61.5	502	104
Steel (mil. met. tons)	13.4	107	105
Fertilizer (mil.tons)	2.8	23.0	106
Metal-cutting tools (mil. rubles)	239	1922	111
Robots (in 1000s)	1.2	9.9	125
Computer Technology (bil. rubles)	0.4	3.2	115
Tractors (mil. hp)	4.3	36.3	104
Paper (mil. metric tons)	0.5	4.1	105
Cement (mil. metric tons)	11.5	89.9	104
Meat(mil. metric tons)	0.8	6.7	107
Margarine (1000 tons)	94.7	907	105
Watches (mils)	5.6	46.3	103
Radios (mils)	0.7	5.9	104
TV sets (mils)	0.8	6.3	103
Automobiles (1000s)	108	880	99.5

LIVESTOCK
(in thousand tons)

	Jan-Aug 1986	Jan-Aug 86 as % of Jan-Aug 85
Cattle	6947	107%
Hogs	3124	106
Sheep & Goats	554	104
Chickens	1694	111

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INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION FIGURES FOR THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS OF 1986

The biggest puzzle continues to be the increase in electricity generation. For the whole eight month period, the Soviets report a four percent increase. In August 1986 compared to August 1985, electrical generation was only up 3.4% Still, even a 3.4% increase is respectable. What is intriguing about the report is, however, that the Soviets continued to indicate that there are regional shortages of electricity. Given the fact that the Soviets have a grid system, there should not be such shortages, even in the Ukraine. The loss of Chernobyl, in other words, does not seem to have made much difference for the country as a whole, despite the local complaints of regional shortages.

As for oil production, it continues to grow. For August 1986 compared to August 1985, production was up 4.4%. For the whole eight months, production is up only 3%, reflecting somewhat lower increases in the earlier part of the year. Nonetheless, the Soviets should be able to produce 12 million barrels a day with no trouble; that is, 600 million tons for the whole year and indeed, it will probably be reasonably above that. As for other industrial commodities, coal production is up for the month of August 1986, compared to the month of August 1985, by 1.8%; gas is up 6.6% (this represents a slight slowing of the rate of growth) and steel production for the month of August was up only 1.5% compared to a 5% increase for the whole eight months.

It is also worth noting that as we mentioned in earlier newsletters, the production of fruit juices is up 53% for the eight months compared to 1985 and non-alcoholic drinks are up 35%

LIVESTOCK

The situation with livestock is very mixed. Whereas last year at this time, the size of the chicken flock was up by almost 4%, this year it is down by over 1%. Similarly, while last year the number of cattle, cows and pigs, sheep and goats were all down compared to what they had been for the comparable period of 1984, this year the number of cattle, sheep and goats and particularly pigs is up sharply. There may be a pattern to this but we are unable to discover what it is.

CURRENCY FIGURES

Rubles Purchased Per 100	Aug 1986	Sept 1986
Austrian shilling	4.69	4.70
UK pound	100.89	101.36
FRG mark	32.99	33.09
US dollar	67.85	68.03
French franc	10.14	10.09
Japanese yen	.442	.437
Italian lira	.0480	.0479
Swiss franc	40.97	[illegible]

THE CHERNOBYL CONFERENCE

The first of the 1986 Corporate Sponsor seminars was held October 6, 1986 at the Harvard Faculty Club. The topic of the conference, Chernobyl: How the Soviet System Responded, was well attended by individuals representing businesses engaged in economic trade with the USSR, utility companies, the media, and Harvard affiliates. The first panel discussed the actual accident, how it happened and why. Panelists included Morris Rosen, Director of Nuclear Safety, International Atomic Energy Agency; Richard Wilson, Mallinckrodt Professor of Physics, Harvard University, and James McKenzie, Senior Associate, World Resources Institute.

The second panel examined the impact of the accident on world energy markets. Presentations were made by Ted Shabad, Professor of Geography at Columbia University and a correspondent for The New York Times; Carol Sakoian, Director of International Government Affairs, Conoco, Inc.; and Raffaele Santoro, Vice Chairman and Executive Vice President, AGIP.

The afternoon panel featured a variety of topics ranging from health implications to domestic and economic policy. Dr. Robert Gale, UCLA Medical School, commented on his work at Hospital No. 6 and what incidence of health disorders may ensue as a result of the accident. Marshall Goldman, Associate Director, Russian Research Center, discussed

Gorbachev's response to Chernobyl and the impact of the accident on Gorbachev's domestic and economic policy. Erik Hoffman, State University of New York at Albany, discussed information policy and published reports about Chernobyl in the Soviet press, and what these reports suggest for Gorbachev's policy of glasnost'. Bernard O'Keefe, Chairman of the Executive Committee, EG&G, provided a lively account of his experience at Three Mile Island and commented on the differences between the Three Mile Island accident and Chernobyl.

While we do not have room to publish a transcription of the conference here, tapes are available at the Russian Research Center.

NOTICE

Please note on your calendars that the dates for the 1987 Arden House Conference have been changed to March 20-22, 1987.

CONFERENCE FOR JOURNALISTS

Whether it is foresight or dumb luck, our journalist's conference this year will feature Nicholas Daniloff as one of our evening speakers. The rest of the session will be devoted to an analysis of the Soviet Union as it prepares for the next major summit meeting between President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Russian Research Center will hold its fourth conference for journalists on November 10, 1986 (Monday), at the Harvard Faculty Club, 20 Quincy Street in Cambridge.

We have enclosed a copy of the program and an application form for the briefing. This conference is intended primarily for journalists and those involved with communications.

THE RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER takes no official stand on any economic or political trend. The views and analyses expressed in this Newsletter are those of the authors directly associated with the article, or unless otherwise stated, with those of the editors, Marshall I. Goldman and Catherine Reed. RRC @ 1986

THE BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE OCT. 5, 1986

Clearing the road to the summit

Superpowers make most of a no-win situation

By Marshall I. Goldman
Special to the Globe

Even though American-Soviet relations are seldom thought of as boring, last week's events were extraordinary. Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze met for a series of secret encounters that whetted our appetites, particularly after Shultz insisted the week before that no such meeting would take place unless Shevardnadze had something of substance to say about Nicholas S. Daniloff. Then on Monday, quick as a blink, Daniloff was whisked out of Moscow with his wife, his Moscow press pass and, of all things, a reentry visa.

Once out of the Soviet Union, Daniloff's release opened the way for the US release of accused Soviet spy Gennadi F. Zakharov, a Soviet promise of freedom to emigrate for dissident Yuri Orlov and, most surprising of all, joint announcement of a preparatory summit in, of all places, Reykjavik, Iceland. What are we to make of all this, and what does it mean for the future?

While nothing is ever smooth or idyllic in American-Soviet relations, the sequence of events could hardly have been predicted a week ago. Economists often speak of a zero-sum game, where one side wins and the other loses. However, the Daniloff-Zakharov standoff appeared to be one that neither side could win. The momentum to the Washington summit expected for December had been broken. The air was filled with recriminations. President Reagan called Zakharov a spy and wrote a letter to Soviet leader Mikhail F. Gorbachev insisting that Daniloff was not a spy. Gorbachev, who had been quiet about the matter up to that point, promptly issued a public comment that Daniloff had been caught red-handed spying. In other words, Reagan was a liar. The only thing missing was a Gorbachev claim that Zakharov was innocent; nonetheless, a Gorbachev spokesman did make such a claim, so Reagan in effect

was saying the Soviet spokesman – and by extension Gorbachev – was a liar.

Under the best of circumstances, finding a graceful way out of this impasse was no easy challenge. But these were not the best of circumstances. It was not enough that Shultz and Shevardnadze would have to deal with each other, they also had to worry about their right-wing flanks. We in the United States are all too aware that Reagan could not appear too soft for fear of unleashing an attack from the Pentagon and conservative politicians who would just as soon never have a summit anyway. The arrest of Daniloff was a made-to-order "I told you so" confrontation for the hard-liners.

What we in the United States often lose sight of is that Gorbachev has the same kind of pressures. Upon his return from the Geneva summit last November, his pleasure at the results was quickly tempered by his generals and his own conservatives, who criticized him for coming home with nothing but sweet nothings from Reagan. Reagan had yielded not an inch, while Gorbachev had hamstrung himself with a test ban on nuclear weapons. As the United States went about testing as usual, the Soviet military lost almost a year and a half of testing time to the United States. That explains Gorbachev's sudden insistence that before there could be any new summit, there would have to be a concrete and signable agreement. Despite Gorbachev's promise to come to the United States in 1986, the Kremlin line soon became "no agreements-no summit."

It was against this background that the Soviet authorities reacted quickly and meanly when their man Zakharov was arrested in a New York subway station. Zakharov had been dealing with his American contact for two to three years and, in Soviet minds, his arrest, one and a half months before the United Nations meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze, was a provocation, much like the sending of the U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union before the Nikita Khrushchev-Dwight Eisenhower summit in 1960. The Soviets responded as they have always responded when one of their representatives without diplomatic immunity is arrested for spying – they arrested an American in Moscow. They did the same in 1963, when they arrested Frederick C. Barghoorn, a professor from Yale University, and in 1978 with Jay Crawford, a businessman with International Harvester. Like good soldiers, the Soviets always hang tough until they bring their man back alive, even if he has to be in prison for a year or two.

Is there a clear winner?

Why was Daniloff picked? He had been a bother to the Soviets; he knew too much about them, but, more than anything else, his term was ending, and his replacement had already arrived. It is always messier when an American is arrested without a replacement on hand. Then there is always the question about whether or not new papers should be issued for a replacement. It is neater and cleaner if the replacement is already in place. Otherwise, it could have been anyone else in Moscow. Always be sure your travel plans call for you to be somewhere other than in the Soviet Union in the weeks following our arrest of a Soviet spy.

What was so impressive about the rapid solution of the standoff is that everyone can claim that the other side blinked first. Actually, an equal victory makes more sense for the future of negotiations than a one-sided victory. Both sides must meet again, and that would be a more difficult thing to arrange if one side felt humiliated.

What about all the original protestations from both sides that there would be no exchange, that each "spy" would be tried, etc.? By now, we should realize that successful diplomacy can be defined as a step-by-step compromise of a country's principles. Since we like to think we hold to a higher set of principles than the Soviets, our compromising will undoubtedly generate more controversy here than would be the case in the Politburo; but there is no doubt that Gorbachev suffered, too. What happened to that new, more open and honest society he had proclaimed?

So, who won this most recent contest? Not that it matters, but an impartial scorekeeper could argue we won. Daniloff had no trial (Crawford was subjected to trial in 1978 and found guilty), and Daniloff was allowed to keep his press pass and journalist reentry visa. The odds are he will never use it, but it allows him to say that the return of these materials by the KGB is a tacit acknowledgment of his innocence. Moreover, the Soviets threw in Orlov. So we get two for one. True, they got Zakharov back, but only after pleading no contest (he reversed his guilty plea, and he agreed to a probation of five years and that he would not return to the United States during that period). I'm sure he won't.

But there are some bigger issues involved. The decision to hold a mini-summit is a breakthrough. By agreeing to meet with only 10 days' notice and in Reykjavik, both sides ensured that the circus environment that would attend such a meeting in Geneva, Washington or Moscow would be absent. There simply aren't the hotel rooms. In fact, except for Katmandu in Nepal, there is probably no better place for such a meeting. In Reykjavik, the two leaders may have an opportunity to discuss some basic differences, rather than worry about preening for public attention.

Equally important, there is no agenda. That is a major shift in position for Gorbachev, who until now has insisted that there could be no summit until there was a fixed agenda where major agreements could be signed, or at least a commitment to a ban on nuclear testing by President Reagan. Gorbachev changed his mind because he probably realized that the recent exchange of taunts between both sides requires a period of mending. His No. 1 priority is economic reform, but he cannot pursue that course until he can reduce or at least freeze his military spending. He needs Reagan for this and a meaningful summit, but after calling Reagan a liar, that would have been difficult to do without this preliminary meeting, where presumably they can pick up where Geneva left off.

The mini-summit is such a good idea that perhaps it should be followed on a regular basis. If the two men meet often enough, we may begin to make less of a fuss about such events. This will allow them to concentrate more on the big issues, to instruct their staffs to resolve rather than create problems which they often do without the proper instructions from their bosses.

The issues that divide our two countries are major ones: the differences in human values, our own insistence on SDI, their insistence on a test ban. None of these will be easily resolved. But there are some important issues on which we may be able to reach agreement, such as nuclear weapons in Western and Eastern Europe, a ban on chemical testing and some agreements on verification and the observance of military maneuvers.

Ten years from now, there will be only a few of us who remember the names Daniloff or Zakharov. In all likelihood, between now and then, there will be other jailed spies and hostages, just as there have always been; but the event that will endure will be the remarkable mini-summit and, one hopes, the more sweeping Washington summit to follow.

Soviets' secret industrial might

Managers create slack in system so they can up production on demand

By Boris Rumer
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Although the Soviet economy is unquestionably in severe straits, its inherent potential is not well known, even to the Soviet government itself.

Among Western analysts it is widely believed that the only practical way for the Soviet Union to reinvigorate the economy is by reducing military spending.

The economy's potential has been exhausted, they say, and the situation is so severe that the Soviet generals must accept a sharp drop in military spending during the current Soviet five-year plan (1986-90).

This, however, is not necessarily true. Soviet sources tend to overstate the achievements of their economy, but they underestimate its industrial potential.

ANALYSIS

There is a case in which this has already been proved.

One of the greatest problems the Soviet economy faces is the country's shortage of steel. Production began to fall in 1979, and many industrial enterprises stood idle because they lacked the metal. But in 1983, steel production shot up.

The increase came about because of an explicit threat from then-Soviet leader Yuri Andropov to Ivan Kazanets, the minister of the Soviet steel industry: Increase steel production or expect the fate of a number of other ministers — dismissal.

A group of workers signed an open letter published in the Communist Party daily Pravda a month after Andropov's rise to power, taking Mr. Kazanets to task: "We have been unable to make shipments of products to critical start-up industrial and agricultural projects, the Western Siberia oil and gas complex, residential projects, and public services. It is incomprehensible to us, Ivan Pavlovich, why management in the steel industry has so little regard for the fulfillment of the state plan and delivery contracts."

Similar letters were printed in Pravda during the Stalin purges in the 1930s. They were clear signals that the addressee was about to be arrested. Of course, the letter to Kazanets did not carry the macabre implications of the Stalin era. But it was a clear ultimatum, and presented the managers of the steel industry with a sudden crisis, not unlike the kind of challenge that would test an army's state of preparedness.

Fortunately for Kazanets, the steel industry passed the test with flying colors — with an increase of 5.3 million tons, which brought steel production for 1983 to an unprecedented 152.5 million tons.

There is no way that Andropov's tightening of the screws could, by itself, have produced the surge in output. The sufficient potential for production had to exist in advance.

A key fallacy of the Soviet government is thus exposed. The government agrees to take enterprises at their word when they say that they use their productive capacities at a very high level and even touts this as one of the advantages of the Soviet economic system. Soviet technical and economic literature frequently reports that the steel industry's production capacity is almost totally (96 percent to 98 percent) utilized.

This is not the case. A government survey of steel-plant capacities done in the late 1960s is the most reliable information available on this point. The researchers found, after studying almost every Soviet steel plant, that the majority of them had deliberately underestimated their production capacity. The plants then — falsely — reported to Gosplan (the State Planning Committee) that they ran their plants at almost 100 percent of their capacity. Gosplan, in turn, accepted these figures and made them the basis for subsequent planning.

This is not an isolated situation. Yakov Kvasha, an authority on Soviet industrial statistics and a leading expert on industrial capacities, noted in 1970 that "without exception there are rather significant amounts of reserve production capacity in every sector of Soviet industry."

Gosplan knows of the deliberate understatement of production capacities; it is an open secret. But no one wants to establish the industry's true potential.

Why? The steel ministry, no less than the steel plants themselves, is interested in maintaining and building up production reserves. There are three reasons:

- Enterprises need room for maneuvering, so that government planners don't commit them to produce more than they are capable of producing.
- Plants must be able to produce on very short notice, in case the government asks them to overfulfill their plan for some special occasion, such as Lenin's birthday or the anniversary of the October Revolution.
- Barter is essential to the Soviet economy, so managers must have at hand a certain amount of unreported production to trade with their fellow managers in other parts of industry for goods that are in short supply and that they can't get through official channels.

If production capacities were reported objectively, the true potential of most enterprises would be seen to be much higher, and the Soviet government would demand that the slack be tightened up.

Also, it would be clear that the plants are not operating on the high level suggested by Soviet statistics — that, in fact, their performance would be comparable to that of the United States steel industry in its bad years — an embarrassing admission for Soviet officialdom.

The same situation can be found in all branches of industry — machine-building, chemical production, construction materials, and so on. Every Soviet industrial enterprise creates and conceals its real production capacities. This has been endemic to the Soviet economy from the very beginning.

Thus, the ability of Soviet industry to do more than Soviet planners expect of them is of considerable significance and could be quickly exploited in the event of a crisis. US specialists generally underestimate the Soviet industrial potential. In a crisis, the economy could perform much better than it does now, without any change to the existing system.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
INTERNATIONAL
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986

Soviet military spending

It's going up, despite weak Soviet economy

By Boris Rumer
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's promise to find a response to President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative should not be seen as a bluff.

Some Western analysts have suggested that the Soviet Union will have to decrease military spending because of its serious economic problems. It is also said that, under Mr. Gorbachev, the Soviet military is weak, since the current defense minister is not a voting member of the ruling Politburo.

But such views ignore important facts.

In the first place, several former executives in the military-industrial complex hold key positions in Soviet economic planning under Gorbachev. They include the Kremlin's No. 3 man, Heavy Industry Secretary Lev Zaikov; the chairman of the state planning committee, Nikolai Talyzin; the overseer of Soviet machine building, Ivan Silayev; and the chairman of the state committee for supply and procurement, Lev Voronin.

Second, Gorbachev is trying to accelerate the growth and quality of machinery production with an 80 percent increase in investment under the current Soviet five-year plan (1986-90). In the past, the only times such increases occurred were between 1934 and the outbreak of World War II, when new arms programs were being developed in anticipation of conflict with Nazi Germany, and between 1966 and 1975, when there was explosive growth in arms production.

By contrast, when Soviet resources were concentrated on improving the domestic economy (in rebuilding the housing-construction boom during the Khrushchev era), the share of machine building in total investment fell to its lowest point.

During Joseph Stalin's pre-war arms buildup, the machine-building industry's share of investment within Soviet industry was 31 percent. It went up to 34 percent during the war, and dropped to 14 percent during the housing boom.

Gorbachev said in May last year that the goals of the Soviet economy today are like those on the eve of World War II, when "it was felt that the threat to the socialist state was increasing," and that a drive to increase Soviet preparedness for war was under way. Indeed, under the current five-year plan, the share of investment in machine building will likely jump to around 30 percent.

An editorial this April in the Soviet Journal of Military History, the mouthpiece of the Ministry of Defense, noted: "The party views the level of development of the economy as one of the decisive factors in strengthening the defensive capability of the state ... and ensuring military victories. In this light, the Communist Party has decided on a broad program for increasing investment in the basic branches of heavy industry."

Clearly, there is a close link between the development of new arms programs and sharp increases in machine-building investment. But just how important is arms production in this investment?

Gorbachev himself revealed the key to this question in June 1985, when he told a meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee that investment in the civilian sector of the machine-building industry amounted to around 5 percent of the total volume of investment in the productive sphere of the economy in the previous five-year plan (1981-85).

The publication of Gorbachev's statement in the open press is an event without precedent. Looking at official statistics on investment in the machine-building industry in the light of Gorbachev's remark, the production of military machinery in 1981-85 consumed just under 60 percent of the total machine-building investment.

The figure is striking and came as a surprise to leading American experts with whom I discussed this matter. Their previous estimates were within the range of 35 percent to 40 percent.

What can be expected in this five-year plan? Will the Soviets maintain or even increase this level of spending?

During the three post-Stalin decades, the average annual rate of growth in machine-building investment was 9 percent in 1956-65, 12 percent in 1966-75, and 3.5 percent to 4 percent in 1976-85. Since about 60 percent of this investment went to defense, it was quite obvious that the decrease in investment over the last decade would hurt the defense sector.

The heavy investment between 1966 and 1975 sharply increased the military's machine-building ability. But one has to allow four to five years for research, development, testing, and construction of weapons systems. Because of this lag, the increased investment continued to be felt through the entire 1976-85 period, but not thereafter. Thus, the spurt in investment from 1966 to 1975 helped to fund the upgrading of arms systems and to create new weapons in the next decade.

However, the investment echo of those years had died away by the time Gorbachev came to power. The sharp slowdown in investment in 1976-85 created a serious threat to the Soviet Union's military strength. Never in the post-Khrushchev era had the defense industry been so hard pressed for investment funds.

The need was urgent. The new Soviet leaders saw that, unless they moved quickly, the United States would gain military superiority over them. There was only one course of action: They must make a strong infusion of investment in defense machine building.

They chose the only path open to them: reducing spending on goods and services. The regime is secure enough that it does not have to fear the reaction of the Soviet population. Thus, Gorbachev's calls for technological progress appear to be primarily for the purpose of modernizing the Soviet defense industry so that it can create a response to SDI.

It is not prudent for the US to assume that the Soviet leaders will back away from new defense programs.

The pattern of current Soviet spending suggests just the opposite.

Second of two articles.

Boris Rumer is a research associate at Harvard University's Russian Research Center.

THE SOVIET UNION: ORIENTATION FOR JOURNALISTS - AND PREPARATION FOR SUMMIT II?

November 10, 1986

Harvard Faculty Club
20 Quincy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138

9:45 a.m.	POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
	Mark Beissinger, Associate Professor of Government, Harvard University and Fellow, Russian Research Center, "Struggle Within the Kremlin"
	Adam Ulam, Gurney Professor of History and Political Science, Harvard University and Director of the Russian Research Center, "American-Soviet Relations: Where are We Headed?"
	Joseph Nye, Professor of Government, Harvard University, Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, "Star Wars and Arms Control: Are the Two Compatible?"
12:30	SHERRY
1:00 p.m.	LUNCH
2:00 p.m.	SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
	David Powell, Fellow, Russian Research Center, "Social Change Inside the Soviet Union"
	Marshall I. Goldman, Class of 1919 Professor of Economics, Wellesley College and Associate Director, Russian Research Center, "Chernobyl and Its Impact on Economic Reform"
4:00 p.m.	Demonstration of live broadcast from Soviet television
5:00 p.m.	COCKTAILS
5:15 p.m.	DINNER
6:30 p.m.	COVERING THE NEWS IN MOSCOW
	Nicholas Daniloff, former Moscow correspondent, U.S. News and World Report
	Maria Casby, Producer, ABC News in Boston, formerly Producer of ABC News, Moscow
8:15 p.m.	ADJOURN

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER and THE NIEMAN FOUNDATION

THE SOVIET UNION: ORIENTATION FOR JOURNALISTS - AND PREPARATION FOR SUMMIT II?

November 10, 1986

Harvard Faculty Club
20 Quincy Street, Cambridge MA 02138

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ADMISSION: $150.00 (one hundred fifty dollars) per participant
Please make checks payable to Harvard University
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HOTEL RESERVATIONS: ( )Single room ( ) Double room
( )date(s) needed:
Confirmation of your room reservation will be sent with your seminar reservation and receipt.

Please return completed form and check to:

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